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RESTANI, Judge. 
     Defendant Kevin E. Taylor ("Taylor") appeals his sentence 
from the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania following the denial of his motion for modification 
of sentence based on recent amendments to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Sentencing Guidelines" or "USSG").  
Taylor challenges his designation as a career offender pursuant 
to USSG § 4B1.1, claiming that his two prior convictions for 
statutory rape do not constitute the predicate "crimes of 
violence" required to apply that guideline. 
 
                           BACKGROUND 
     On April 3, 1989, Taylor entered a plea of guilty to three 
felony drug counts, specifically, one count of conspiring to 
distribute 3-methyl-fentanyl, heroin, and cocaine, and two 
substantive counts of distribution of heroin.  At the sentencing 
hearing held on June 28, 1989, the district court ruled that 
Taylor was a career offender pursuant to USSG § 4B1.1.  The court 
determined that Taylor's previous conviction for aggravated 
assault and two separate convictions for statutory rape 
constituted three prior convictions for "crimes of violence"  
under section 4B1.1.  As a result, Taylor was sentenced to a term 
of 20 years imprisonment.  Taylor appealed and his sentence was 
affirmed by an order dated March 8, 1990.  United States v. 
Taylor, 899 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir. 1990).  On November 30, 1995, the 
district court denied Taylor's motion for modification of 
sentence because of Sentencing Guideline changes with regard to 
prior convictions for "crimes of violence."  (App. 311)  Taylor 
does not challenge the determination that his 1984 conviction for 
aggravated assault is a "crime of violence" under the new law.  
Taylor does, however, challenge the district court's finding that 
his two prior convictions for statutory rape in 1975 and 1980 
continue to qualify as "crimes of violence." 
 
                           JURISDICTION 
 
     Taylor appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion 
for modification of sentence.  The district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction of the original proceeding against Taylor 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and the authority to consider the 
motion for modification of sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3742(a).  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
                        STANDARD OF REVIEW 
     We review a district court's factual determinations 
underlying the application of the sentencing guidelines for clear 
error. United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773, 774 (3d Cir. 
1990).  Although we give due deference to the district court's 
application of the sentencing guidelines to those facts, id.(citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(e)), we exercise plenary review over 
legal questions concerning the proper interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 
12-13 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
                            DISCUSSION 
     The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant is a 
career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years 
old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense 
is a felony that is either a "crime of violence" or a controlled 
substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior 
felony convictions for either "crimes of violence" or controlled 
substance offenses.  See United States Sentencing Commission, 
Guidelines Manual, § 4B1.1 (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter "USSG"].  
Taylor does not dispute the district court's finding that the 
first two subsections of § 4B1.1 are satisfied.  He does, 
however, argue that neither of his prior convictions for 
statutory rape qualify as "crimes of violence" under section 
4B1.1.  In order to satisfy the two prior "crimes of violence" 
requirement, one of these convictions must qualify, along with 
the admittedly qualifying aggravated assault felony conviction. 
     In concluding that Taylor's prior convictions for statutory 
rape were "crimes of violence," the sentencing court originally 
looked to the underlying conduct which gave rise to the offense.  
This analysis was later affirmed as the law in this circuit in 
United States v. John, 936 F.2d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1991).  On 
November 1, 1991 and November 1, 1992, however, Application Note 
2 to USSG § 4B1.2 was modified by Amendments 433 and 461, 
respectively.  USSG App. C at 311-12, 342-43.  Application Note 2 
now provides in relevant part: 
     "Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, 
     kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, 
     robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of 
     credit, and burglary of a dwelling.  Other offenses are 
     included where (A) that offense has as an element the 
     use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
     against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set 
     forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which 
     the defendant was convicted involved use of explosives 
     (including any explosive material or destructive 
     device) or, by its nature, presented a serious 
     potential risk of physical injury to another.  Under 
     this section, the conduct of which the defendant was 
     convicted is the focus of the inquiry. 
 
USSG § 4B1.2, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added to indicate 
additions made by Amendments 433 and 461). 
     The retroactivity of the amendments is specifically 
addressed in USSG § 1B1.10, which provides: 
     (a)  Where a defendant is serving a term of 
     imprisonment, and the guideline range applicable to 
     that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a 
     result of an amendment to the Guidelines Manual listed 
     in subsection (c) below, a reduction in the defendant's 
     term of imprisonment is authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 
     3582(c)(2). . . . 
 
     * * * 
 
     (c)  Amendments covered by this policy statement are 
     listed in Appendix C as follows:  . . . 433, . . . 461 
     . . . . 
 
USSG § 1B1.10.  The retroactivity of Amendments 433 and 461 was 
recognized by the district court in its denial of Taylor's motion 
for modification of sentence. (App. 312) 
     Prior to the amendments to Application Note 2, this court 
stated that: 
     the Sentencing Commission essentially envisioned three 
     independent ways by which a prior conviction will be 
     considered a "crime of violence":  (1) the prior 
     conviction is for a crime that is among those 
     specifically enumerated (murder, manslaughter, 
     kidnapping, etc.); (2) the prior conviction is for a 
     crime that, although not specifically enumerated, has 
     as an element of the offense the use, attempted use, or 
     threatened use of physical force; or (3) the prior 
     conviction is for a crime that, although neither 
     specifically enumerated nor involving physical force as 
     an element of the offense, involves conduct posing a 
     serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 
 
United States v. John, 936 F.2d at 767 (emphasis in original).  
While recognizing that it is "impermissible" and "pointless" for 
the court to look to the defendant's actual criminal conduct 
under the first two prongs, the court found that, "the third 
prong quite clearly permits the court to examine the defendant's 
actual conduct to ascertain whether that conduct posed a 
sufficient potential risk of physical injury to another to 
elevate the crime to a 'crime of violence.'"  Id. at 767-68. 
     Following the amendments to Application Note 2, this court 
reconsidered its prior holding in John.  United States v. Joshua, 
976 F.2d 844, 852 (3d Cir. 1992).  The Joshua court noted that 
its prior holding in John entitled the sentencing court to look 
beyond the facts charged in the indictment to the defendant's 
underlying conduct, including all relevant conduct under USSG § 
1B1.3, in determining whether the defendant's predicate offense 
involved a serious potential risk of injury to another under the 
third prong of the analysis.  Id.  The court acknowledged, 
however, that the recent amendment to Application Note 2 
restricted the sentencing court's power to look beyond the 
conduct expressly charged in the indictment.  Id.  Given the 
conflict between the court's holding in John and the amended 
commentary, the Joshua court decided that "a panel may consider 
new commentary text where another panel of this court has already 
resolved the ambiguity and that a second panel is entitled to 
defer to the new commentary even when it mandates a result 
different from that of the prior panel."  Id. at 856; accordStinson v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993) (stating, 
"[a]mended commentary is binding on the federal courts even 
though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior judicial 
constructions of a particular guideline cannot prevent the 
Commission from adopting a conflicting interpretation that 
satisfies the standard we set forth today").  The court then 
concluded that, "a sentencing court should look solely to the 
conduct alleged in the count of the indictment charging the 
offense of conviction in order to determine whether that offense 
is a crime of violence under subsection (ii) of the guideline."  
Joshua, 976 F.2d at 856.  This law guides us today, as it did the 
district court's consideration of the motion for sentence 
modification. 
     Taylor's first statutory rape conviction occurred in 1975.  
The indictment for this offense charges six counts, in which 
crimes were not specifically named.  The guilty plea form, 
however, summarizes the indictment as follows:  1st Count: 
Attempt Rape (Sec. 901-3121); 2nd Count: Involuntary Sexual 
Deviate Intercourse (Sec. 3123); 3rd Count: Indecent Assault 
(Sec. 3126); 4th Count: Recklessly Endangering Another Person 
(Sec. 2705); 5th Count: Simple Assault (Sec. 2701-a-1); and 6th 
Count: Terroristic Threats (Sec. 2706).  (App. 118-19)  Despite 
the absence of a statutory rape charge in the indictment, the 
guilty plea form stated that on July 14, 1975, the defendant, 
"pleads guilty to the charge of Statutory Rape (Section 3122) a 
Felony of the 2nd degree proffered in the within indictment at 
count (2) only and consents to the pronouncement of sentence 
forthwith."  (App. 119) 
     The first count of the indictment alleges that Taylor 
"unlawfully and feloniously did engage in deviate sexual 
intercourse by or with the anus of [the victim], a minor under 
the age of 16 years, to-wit:  of the age of 12 years and upwards 
. . . ."  (App. 118)  The second count of the indictment alleges 
that Taylor: 
     unlawfully and feloniously did attempt to engage in 
     sexual intercourse with [the victim], not his spouse, 
     she, [the victim], being under the age of 16 years, to 
     wit:  of the age of 12 years and upwards, and in 
     furtherance of said attempt did do and commit certain 
     acts constituting a substantial step toward the 
     commission of said offense, to wit:  . . . TAYLOR did 
     grab [the victim] off the street onto the ballfield . . 
     . threw her on the ground, got on top of [the victim], 
     and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, . . 
     . ." 
 
(App. 118)  Both parties, however, agree that on the guilty plea 
form where the counts of the indictment are listed, the captions 
for Count 1 and Count 2 are reversed.  There, Count 1 should be 
listed as Involuntary Sexual Deviate Intercourse and Count 2 
should be listed as Attempt Rape.  See Appellant's Br. at 18 n.8; 
Appellee's Br. at 10.  Because of the confusion, the government 
requests that we consider the crime of statutory rape as violent, 
per se, without regard to the language of the indictment.  
Appellee's Br. at 11. 
     Taylor's second "statutory rape" conviction occurred in 
1980.  Taylor was charged by means of an information, which 
alleged four counts.  (App. 120-24)  Count 1 of the information 
charged Taylor with statutory rape; Count 2 charged Taylor with 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; and Counts 3 and 4 
charged Taylor with indecent exposure and corruption of minors, 
respectively.  Count 3 specifically alleged that: 
     [t]he actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying 
     the sexual desire of himself or another person exposed 
     his genitals under circumstances in which he knew his 
     conduct was likely to cause affront or alarm, namely, 
     forced [the victim] onto her bed and while holding her 
     down opened his trousers and pulled out his penis . . . 
     . 
 
(App. 124)  Taylor was tried on these charges and subsequently 
convicted on July 15, 1980 as to Counts 1, 3, and 4 with a 
demurrer being sustained as to Count 2.  (App. 121) 
     Upon consideration of Taylor's motion to modify the 
sentence, the district court again found that the 1975 statutory 
rape conviction constituted a "crime of violence."  (App. 316)  
At the outset, the court noted that under Pennsylvania law, the 
crime of statutory rape does not contain an element of force.  
(App. 314 & n.2)  The court went on to state that USSG § 4B1.2 
"instructs the courts to examine not only the elements of the 
crime, but also whether the conduct of the defendant as set forth 
in the counts at which he was convicted 'presented a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.'"  (App. 314)  The 
court then considered the language of the indictment, which the 
government now abandons, and stated that, "Count two of the 
indictment, the statutory rape count for which defendant was 
convicted, specifically alleged that defendant 'did grab the 
[victim] off the street onto the ballfield . . . threw her on the 
ground, got on top of [her], and attempted to have sexual 
intercourse with her . . . ."  (App. 315)  The district court 
concluded that such action unquestionably presented a potential 
risk of serious injury to a child of less than 14 years of age.  
(App. 316) 
     As to the 1980 conviction, the district court noted that 
count one "expressly alleges that the defendant engaged in sexual 
intercourse with the victim, who was less than 14 years of age" 
and, "[c]ount three, indecent exposure, alleges that defendant 
'forced' the victim onto a bed and, 'while holding her down,' 
exposed himself in a manner which would knowingly affront and 
alarm the victim."  (App. 315) 
     While this circuit has not ruled on the question of whether 
statutory rape constitutes a "crime of violence" for purposes of 
the sentencing guidelines, the district court noted that the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that the crime 
of sexual intercourse with a child under 16 years of age 
constitutes a "crime of violence" under the career offender 
statute.  (App. 315)  United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373, 375 
(8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).  Additionally, the district court 
noted several other cases cited by the government in which other 
courts have held that crimes involving an adult having sexual 
contact with a minor constitute "crimes of violence."  (App. 316)  
See United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272 (9th Cir.) (finding 
indecent liberties a "crime of violence"), cert. denied, 116 
S.Ct. 217 (1995); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding sexual abuse a "crime of violence" 
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 
138 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding lascivious acts with children a 
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)). 
     In the present case, because the district court held that 
"the criminal counts for which defendant was convicted 
specifically allege conduct which created a potential risk of 
physical harm to the respective victims," it did not need to 
resolve whether statutory rape is, in all cases, a "crime of 
violence."  (App. 316)  The court stated that in its judgment: 
     there is unquestionably a potential risk of serious 
     injury to a child of less than 14 years of age where an 
     adult grabs the victim off the street, throws her to 
     the ground and attempts to engage in sexual intercourse 
     [referring to the 1975 indictment].  Likewise, the 
     potential for injury to a child who is forced onto a 
     bed and restrained while the adult commits a sexual act 
     upon her is no less manifest [referring to the 1980 
     information].  (App. 316) 
 
The government continues to rely on both the 1975 and 1980 
convictions, arguing that the crime of statutory rape, by its 
nature, qualifies as a "crime of violence."  Like the district 
court, however, we need not make this determination, as Taylor's 
sentence may be affirmed based on the 1980 information and 
conviction for indecent exposure. 
     Taylor claims that the district court's determination may 
not be sustained based on the facts alleged in the indecent 
exposure count for two reasons.  First, in finding Taylor to be a 
career offender, the district court cited three prior crimes of 
violence:  the 1975 statutory rape, the 1980 statutory rape, and 
the aggravated assault.  Taylor contends that because the 
district court did not rely upon the indecent exposure conviction 
as one of the predicate offenses at sentencing, it cannot be used 
now.  Second, Taylor argues that once the statutory rape 
conviction was chosen as a predicate offense, it is the charging 
language with regard to that count and that count only which may 
be examined to determine if that crime was a "crime of violence" 
and language with regard to any other count in the information is 
irrelevant. 
     We find, however, that the district court, although making 
an introductory reference to the 1980 conviction as "the second 
statutory rape," clearly acknowledged that it was considering the 
three separate counts of conviction.  In finding that Taylor was 
properly designated as a career offender, the district court 
stated that, "the criminal counts for which defendant was 
convicted specifically allege conduct which created a potential 
risk of physical harm to the respective victims . . . ."  (App. 
316)  The district court then referenced the facts alleged 
relating to Taylor's 1975 statutory rape conviction and 1980 
indecent exposure conviction (quoted supra at p. 13 (App. 316)).  
We do not find it significant that the district court repeatedly 
referred to Taylor's 1980 statutory rape conviction, rather than 
his indecent exposure conviction, as the three counts of 
conviction were merged for purposes of assessing criminal history 
points in the presentence report pursuant to USSG § 4A1.1(a).  
Moreover, even if the district court did not consider Taylor's 
statutory rape and indecent exposure convictions separately, 
appellee may assert any ground in support of the judgment below, 
whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by 
the district court.  Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 397 n.16 
(1979).  As the facts alleged in the indecent exposure count 
unquestionably present a potential for serious injury to the 
victim, we find that the district court properly determined that 
this conviction constituted a prior felony conviction for a 
"crime of violence."  Accordingly, given the indecent exposure 
conviction and Taylor's prior conviction for aggravated assault, 
we hold that Taylor's designation as a career offender pursuant 
to USSG § 4B1.1 and his corresponding sentence was correct. 
     The opinion of the district court is affirmed. 
